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Abstract: Traditional cost sharing for health care is stymied by limited patient wealth. The 
“split benefit” is a new way to reduce consumption of high-cost, low-value treatments for which 
the risk/benefit ratio is uncertain. When a physician prescribes a costly unproven procedure, the 
insurer could pay a portion of the benefit directly to the patient, creating a decision opportunity 
for the patient. The insurer saves the remainder, unless the patient consumes. In this paper, 
a vignette-based randomized controlled experiment with 1,800 respondents sought to test the 
potential efficacy of the split benefit. The intervention reduced the odds of consumption by about 
half. It did so regardless of scenario (cancer or cardiac stent), type of split (rebate, prepay, or 
health savings account), or amount of split (US$5,000 or US$15,000). Respondents viewed the 
insurer that paid a split as behaving fairly, as it preserved access and choice. Three-quarters of 
respondents supported such use in Medicare, which did not depend on political party affiliation. 
The reform is promising for further testing since it has the potential to decrease spending on 
low-value interventions, and thereby increase the value of the health care dollar.
Keywords: insurance, payment, reform, incentive, benefit
Introduction and background
The problem of costly unproven health care
A primary goal of health insurance reformers is to move consumption away from 
the high-cost, low-value health care, which is a major driver of the growth of health 
insurance costs. Some “expensive treatments, such as stents for cardiovascular disease, 
are high value for some patients but poor value for others”.1 There is also “a large 
and expanding set of treatments, such as proton beam therapy or robotic surgery, 
that contribute to rapid increases in spending despite questionable health benefits”.1 
Although “estimates vary, some experts believe that less than half of all medical care 
is based on or supported by adequate evidence about its effectiveness”.2 In some sec-
tors of health care, “off-label” prescriptions – those that are being used for purposes 
where the Food and Drug Administration has not reviewed efficacy – account for half 
of all prescriptions.3
Broad-based initiatives, such as Choosing Wisely,4 Clinical Evidence,5 Less is 
More,6 National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence,7 and recent reviews,8 
focus on identifying which procedures provide minimal or no benefit. In the US, no 
single solution has been proposed to drive adoption of these recommendations by the 
medical community. There are political, legal, and market limits that prevent insurers 
and physicians from simply rationing care, at least in the US. While a physician-based 
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component in bending the cost curve, voluntary adoption 
of the recommendations by physicians, based on guidance 
from expert panels, suffers from slow adoption and may be 
contrary to professional norms and incentives.1
The limits of traditional cost sharing
Cost sharing is the most commonly discussed approach to 
this issue of moral hazard, where patients consume low-value 
care without regard for cost. Some public and private insur-
ers are changing cost sharing policies by increasing co-pays, 
co-insurance, and deductibles. These “consumer-directed 
care” policies are designed to cause patients to weigh the 
benefits of such procedures against a portion of the costs, and 
they work to reduce consumption without harming health, 
in some situations.9,10
Cost sharing does not, however, work for highly expen-
sive treatments, far beyond the scale of patient wealth. 
Instead, insurers provide annual limits on their beneficiaries’ 
out-of-pocket obligations. Most workers (59%) have cost 
sharing obligations capped at some amount less than 
US$3,000 per year.11 “Once consumers reach the limits of the 
deductible, they have little reason to limit their consumption 
of health care or to pay attention to its price.”12
While an obvious solution is to simply raise the limits, 
in a world of limited patient wealth, such increases begin to 
defeat the purpose of insurance (pooling risk and guarantee-
ing access to care).13 Consequently, some patients refuse 
high-value care, and others who stretch to buy care are forced 
to declare bankruptcy.9,14–17
The split benefit model
This article tests a novel solution in health insurance 
policy design, called a “split benefit”, focusing on high-cost 
interventions for which the value is uncertain. Currently, 
insurance is provided as an “in-kind” benefit, which is paid 
directly to the provider; this creates a sunk cost, thereby 
biasing decisions toward consumption. In the split benefit 
model, the insurer can split the benefit between the benefi-
ciary and the provider.18 The insurer pays the provider only 
if the patient consumes.
For example, for an expensive (say, US$50,000) proce-
dure that the physician prescribes and the insurer must cover, 
the insurer will pay to the patient a fraction of the charge for 
the treatment (say, US$5,000). Then, the patient will have the 
option of using that US$5,000 for the treatment, with the 
insurer matching by paying the US$45,000 to the provider as 
usual. Or, the patient could keep the US$5,000 for some other 
purpose, which can vary. While preserving the risk-reducing 
feature of insurance, the split benefit makes part of the 
insurance benefit fungible, causing the patient to weigh the 
value of the treatment against other consumption  alternatives. 
If patients decline the expensive, unproven treatment, the 
health insurer will save the balance (US$45,000).
The payor can exercise the split benefit as a unilateral 
option whenever it is most likely to save money. It is con-
sistent with current insurance contracts and regulations since 
it does not change coverage or the size of the benefit. It does 
not “ration” care, which the Medicare statute prohibits. Of 
course, the split benefit is not intended for inexpensive care 
where traditional cost sharing works. It is also contraindicated 
for high-value care, like vaccinations, and for care that is so 
frivolous that the insurer can exclude its coverage altogether. 
A vast swath remains between these poles.
The split benefit can be used alongside other cost-control 
mechanisms, including traditional cost sharing, exclusions 
of coverage, pre-authorizations, and fail-first policies. If the 
split is only a small fraction of the total cost of the procedure, 
the insurer can make several such payments for each instance 
of full-cost care that is deterred on the margin.
Empirical questions about  
the split benefit concept
This split benefit proposal raises important empirical 
questions. Would it actually save money? What size pay-
ment will be the “sweet spot” that saves the most money for 
the insurer at the least risk of wasteful payments on those 
who would not have consumed anyway? Which of the vari-
ous ways that a split could be given – paid in advance, paid 
as a rebate of premiums for patients declining to consume, 
or deposited into a health savings account – would be most 
effective? Would beneficiaries view their insurers negatively 
if they paid a split benefit?
Ideally, these questions would be tested in real-world pilot 
experiments with sick patients and real money on the line. 
However, given the expense, logistics, and ethical limitations 
of such research, it is worthwhile to start with a laboratory 
study for this novel concept of health care reform. This article 
reports such an experiment.
Experimental methods
The Supplementary material provides detail, but in short: 
the concept was tested with subjects participating as “mock 
patients” in an online randomized experiment, using 
clinical vignettes, depicting decisions about whether to 
consume high-cost, low-value treatments. After collecting 
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Split benefit health insurance reform
Table 1 Insurance status of responders
Insurance status %
Private insurance through my current or former employer or union 33%
no, I am not currently covered by a health insurance plan 24%
Private insurance through my spouse or partner’s current or  
former employer or union
15%
Private insurance bought directly from an insurance company or  
HMO, or through a broker
9%
Other, or I don’t know 6%
a state’s Medicaid program 6%
Medicare 4%
cHaMPUs, Tricare, cHaMPVa, Veterans administration, or 
other military health care
2%
Indian Health service, a tribal health program, or urban Indian clinic 0%
Total 100%
Abbreviations: cHaMPVa, civilian Health and Medical Program of the Veterans 
administration; cHaMPUs, civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed 
services; HMO, health maintenance organization.
of insurance coverage (if any), participants were asked to 
imagine that they were ill, facing a health care decision.
Two clinical vignettes depicting off-label use of expen-
sive procedures were used: heart stent and cancer drug. 
Hundreds of thousands of drug-eluting coronary stents are 
implanted each year for preventative purposes, with charges 
of US$30,000–US$100,000 each, even though they are not 
proven more effective than the cheaper and safer standard of 
care.1,19 Likewise, oncologists routinely use patented drugs, 
like Avastin® (Genentech Roche, San Francisco, CA, USA), 
with charges of over US$80,000 for a course of treatment, 
for many conditions where they are unproven to provide any 
benefit.3 Halfway through the vignettes, the subjects were 
asked to write a few sentences about how they would respond 
to the scenario, just to increase engagement with the decision. 
Both vignettes were pilot tested and refined for clarity and 
content prior to use in the experiment described below.
Using a (two diseases × three types × two amounts) facto-
rial design, these mock patients were randomized into either 
of the vignettes and into one of six split benefit conditions 
(manipulating type and amount of split) or control conditions 
(one for each disease). Each subject was randomized to a 
single condition. “Control” explained that the patient enjoyed 
full insurance, having surpassed annual cost sharing maxi-
mums. “Prepay” is a payment via bank check that the patient 
receives in advance of the health care decision, and simply 
keeps if they decline care. “Rebate” is an offer of payment 
after the decision is made, conditional on declining care, and 
is framed as a “rebate” of insurance premiums. “Limited” is 
also a prepayment, but paid into an account with fungibility 
limited to other health expenses, similar to a health savings 
account. Two levels of split (US$5,000 and US$15,000) were 
compared for each payment method.
Based on prospective power analyses (discussed in 
the Supplementary material), the study sought to recruit 
1,800 participants to each review a single vignette in between-
subjects design. “Exempt” approval was received from the 
Human Subjects Protection Program at The University of 
Arizona (Tucson, AZ, USA), and a task was designed on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (Amazon.com, Inc., Seattle, WA, 
USA), paying US$0.75 per respondent. Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk’s screening feature was used to limit respondents 
to those within the US geographically. It was specified that 
respondents must be 18 years of age, and be able to read and 
write English.
After excluding respondents who failed to complete 
the task – those who did so in unreasonably long or short 
times – and duplicate records, there were 1,763 responses. 
Qualtrics® (Qualtrics, LLC, Provo, UT, USA) was used to 
randomly assign the respondents, yielding 425 in control, 449 
in limited, 447 in prepay, and 447 in rebate conditions. There 
were 664 respondents for the US$5,000 payment condition 
versus 679 in the US$15,000 payment condition.
Results and statistical analyses
respondents
The study population was 52% male. In terms of education, 
11% had graduated high school or had less education, while 
40% had some college or an associate’s degree and 49% had 
a bachelor’s degree or more (including 12% with advanced 
degrees). Ages ranged from 18–74 years, with a mean of 
32 and a median of 28. In terms of race and ethnicity, 83% 
of the study population reported being white, along with 6% 
reporting being black or African American, and 7% Asian. 
A remaining 4% reported being American Indian, Native 
Hawaiian, or other races. Politically, after flattening the seven-
level scale, 21% identified as Republicans, 18% as Indepen-
dents, and 61% as Democrats. The most common income 
range was US$20,000–US$29,999 (15%) and two-thirds 
of the respondents had family incomes below US$59,999. 
Table 1 shows the insurance status of respondents. The modal 
respondent (33%) had private insurance through a current 
or former employer or union, with another 15% insured 
through the spouse’s employer (total 48%). The next most 
common response was uninsured (24%). For the non-elderly 
population nationally, this compares to 56% getting insur-
ance from employers and 18% being uninsured.20 Of those 
who had insurance, 31% reported that they were in a “high 
deductible health plan”. One in seven (14%) reported that 
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Figure 1 Intention to consume by experimental condition.
Notes: *statistical significance (P,0.05) in Yates-adjusted χ2 tests; n=1,768.
significantly associated with the primary dependent variable, 
intent to consume (insurance status χ2[4]=3.85, P=0.43; high 
deductibles χ2[2]=0.19, P=0.66; or health savings accounts 
χ2[2]=5.16, P=0.08).
Efficacy in reducing consumption
As the primary dependent variable, respondents were 
asked about the likelihood that they would consume the 
offered health care on a six-point Likert scale, which was 
converted to a binary outcome for analysis. The split benefit 
substantially reduced intent to consume. Across conditions, 
a large main effect appeared (Figure 1). In the control condi-
tion, 55% of respondents expressed an intention to consume, 
while across all split conditions, only 37% did so (odds ratio 
[OR]: 0.48, confidence interval [CI]: 0.38–0.60, P,0.0001). 
The effect was especially strong in the cancer scenario, mov-
ing respondents from 69% in the control condition to 42% 
across all splits (OR: 0.32, CI: 0.23–0.45, P,0.0001). An 
effect also appeared in the stent scenario, moving respon-
dents from 42% consuming to 33% consuming (OR: 0.67, 
CI: 0.49–0.92, P,0.01).
The proportion reporting an intent to consume, split by 
experimental condition, is shown in Figure 1. The varia-
tions as to type of payment did not differ in their efficacy 
in reducing intent to consume (P=0.40). Only within the 
cancer scenario was there a significant difference between 
the US$5,000 and the US$15,000 split.
Finally, it was checked whether the flattening of the six-
level scale for intent to consume to a binary variable had the 
consequence of discarding interesting information. As shown 
in Figures S1–S3, no interesting differences were observed.
regression models
The logistic regression analyses, accounting for demographic 
factors and disease type, predict intent to consume – the pri-
mary dependent variable. As shown in Table S1, compared 
to the control condition (the reference of 1.0), the prepay 
condition reduces consumption very significantly (OR: 0.48, 
CI: 0.36–0.64), as does the limited condition (OR: 0.51, 
CI: 0.38–0.69) and the rebate condition (OR: 0.43, CI: 
0.32–0.57).
The various split benefit conditions also manipulated 
whether the insurer paid a US$5,000 versus a US$15,000 
split. The levels of payment were indistinguishable in their 
effectiveness (OR: 0.94, CI: 0.75–1.17, P=0.59). This find-
ing is promising, because it suggests that insurers can use 
small splits that expose them to very little risk of losing 
money on net.
Perceived fairness of insurer
Respondents overwhelmingly thought that the insurer treated 
them very fairly, regardless of whether it paid a split benefit 
(Figure 2). Nonetheless, there were slightly different levels of 
agreement (P=0.01), with higher fairness rating in the control 
(95%) and prepay (95%) conditions than the limited (92%) 
and rebate (90%) conditions. The amount of split made no 
detectable difference on this dependent variable (P=0.16).
support for reform in Medicare
Support for the idea of using the split benefit as a reform 
to Medicare was also examined. Overall, broad support 
was found, with 74% somewhat supporting, supporting, or 
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Figure 2 Perceptions that “insurer treated me fairly” by experimental condition.
Notes: agreement includes those responding “strongly agree”, “agree”, or “somewhat agree” on a six-point likert scale; n=1,768; χ2(3)=10.62; P=0.01.
Little variation by






















What if the split could only be used
for other health expenses?
Figure 3 Support for split benefit as Medicare reform.
Notes: n=1,768; politics: P=0.18; income: P=0.01.
Abbreviations: rep, republicans; Ind, Independents; Dem, Democrats.
support did not depend on political affiliations, with Republi-
cans (n=366, 70%), Independents (n=321, 77%), and Demo-
crats (n=1,081, 74%) showing similar favorability (P=0.18). 
Lower income individuals were slightly more supportive of 
using the split benefit in Medicare (77% versus 71%, OR: 
1.36, CI: 1.17–1.59, P,0.01).
For the Medicare reform questions, the types of split 
benefit in the primary “support reform” question were not 
specified. Respondents were subsequently asked, “What if 
the proposal included a feature that required that people who 
keep the split must deposit it in a health savings account, 
so that the money could only be used for future qualified 
health expenses? Would that make you more, or less, likely 
to support the proposal?” On a seven-point Likert scale, 
nearly two-thirds of the respondents (64%) indicated that it 
would make them more likely (including somewhat and much 
more likely) to support the proposal if so limited. As shown 
above, such a limited payment may be equally effective at 
reducing low-value care.
Discussion
The foregoing results are promising, as they suggest that 
the split benefit could be useful as a way for public and 
private insurers to reduce consumption of the high-cost, 
low-value care that drives much of health spending. And, 
they can do so without reducing access or infringing on 
patient choice. Indeed, the data suggests that insurers have 
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Those paying a split will be perceived fairly, since after all, 
the only effect of a split is to increase the patient’s wealth 
and options.
This pilot study had a number of limitations. First, it used 
clinical vignettes in which patients were asked to imagine 
themselves in future situations, and to decide on that basis 
what they would do. The null results found with regard to type 
and amount of split may be due to the hypothetical nature 
of the task. Although respondents were asked to write about 
how they would feel in the situation, real patients may have 
a more profound emotional response, which would affect 
their treatment decisions. Second, the respondents were 
recruited from an online population that, although reasonably 
diverse, was not a demographically valid sample represent-
ing any particular insurance pool. Third, it used vignettes of 
two different medical domains where the split benefit might 
be utilized to reduce off-label consumption of expensive 
products. The reform might have larger, or smaller, effects 
in other contexts. Finally, the demographics of the study 
population varied substantially in comparison to the US 
population. The subject pool included fewer people at the 
very bottom of the education range (less than high school or 
General Educational Development [GED]), and fewer people 
at the high end of the age range (over 65 years). The study 
population is also somewhat less diverse in terms of race 
and ethnicity. The study population also skewed to the left 
politically, compared to the national population. As shown 
in the regressions, across all these demographic factors, in 
logistic regression it was found that only sex was associated 
with the primary dependent variable, intent to consume (OR: 
1.32 CI: 1.09–1.61, P=0.004).
While the results are promising, several objections to 
the split benefit model come immediately to mind. Some 
have to do with “gaming” the system. Under such a reform, 
insurers would need to carefully regulate their strategies to 
minimize the risk of patients seeking split benefit payments 
for care that they otherwise would not have consumed any-
way. Insurers could impose “fail first” policies, for example, 
that required patients and their providers to try standard of 
care treatments before even considering a treatment that 
might qualify for a split benefit payment. Patients choosing 
to forgo treatment in favor of the cash payment would not be 
eligible for full insurance coverage should they opt for the 
same intervention at some later stage. Since the split benefit 
would only be implemented for low-value interventions, 
individuals would still be eligible for insurance coverage 
for standard of care treatment for subsequent conditions or 
events. Even with these stipulations, there would likely be 
some degree of false demand stimulation. However, the split 
benefit reform may save money on net, if the payments are 
relatively small compared to the charge for the treatment. If 
an insurer can save US$45,000 by paying US$5,000, several 
instances of false demand can be tolerated, even while saving 
money on net.
The legal, clinical, and ethical implications of the split 
benefit model have been discussed in detail previously.18 
Importantly, once a split benefit is paid, it functions in exactly 
the same way as a traditional co-insurance obligation. The 
advantage of a split benefit is that the strategy is not stymied 
by patient wealth. Unlike traditional cost sharing the burden 
does not undermine access to health care or drive anyone 
into bankruptcy or foreclosure.
One might recommend that the only interventions eligible 
for the split benefit model are those lacking clinical evidence 
of benefit. Unfortunately, a very large proportion of US health 
care spending has this character. For these interventions, 
where the clinical risk/benefit ratio is unclear, the payment 
of a split benefit does not make patients worse off than they 
would otherwise be. The decision to forgo treatment in these 
circumstances cannot be construed as choosing suboptimal 
care, because in this vacuum of evidence, it cannot be said 
that consumption is better than declining care.
The split benefit approach is most readily implemented 
by insurers in a fee for service payment model, and may 
help counteract some of the misaligned incentives that exist 
in those models. Under a capitation payment model, the 
provider instead bears the risk that patients will consume 
expensive health care. In principle, such providers could pay 
split benefits to patients as well. However, such an active role 
may undermine the relationship between patient and provider 
as it sharpens the conflicting interests.
The split benefit has been proposed not only as a way 
for private insurers to reduce the cost (and/or increase the 
actuarial value) of health insurance, but also as a reform 
for public insurers such as Medicare, seeking the same 
improvements. Reforms to such public programs are often 
highly contentious, and often polarizing between the political 
parties. Remarkably, the respondents in this study seemed 
generally supportive of the split benefit as a reform and did 
not polarize along party lines. Future public opinion survey 
research – with demographically valid samples – is necessary, 
but these results are promising.
Ultimately, the split benefit is attractive because, while 
cutting costs for insurers and insurance buyers, the mecha-
nism keeps the consumption decision in the hands of the 
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Split benefit health insurance reform
the split benefit will thus be a more attractive solution than 
further expansion of traditional cost sharing or outright 
rationing, which can stymie choice and reduce access. A pow-
erful approach to increase the value of the health care dollar, 
where value is the quotient of outcomes/costs, is to decrease 
either utilization or spending on low-value interventions. The 
split benefit model can potentially accomplish both.
Disclosure
The authors report no conflicts of interest in this work.
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